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Abstract
Community based resource management programmes are deemed to work best in 
an environment in which the groups are small in size and have face to face 
interaction. The argument is that benefits from natural resource management are 
significant when they are confined to a small group. Further, it is argued that rules 
governing natural resource management work best in an environment in which 
membership is localized and demographically small. This research examines a 
community-based programme, CAMPFIRE2, and shows that in certain instances 
local people do support increases in community membership. The research further 
argues that those implementing CAMPFIRE must intensify their efforts to make 
sure that these communities do not increase their membership, as evidence has 
shown that this can adversely affect the programme.
2 Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
Introduction
CAMPFIRE is a national initiative which attempts to put the management of wildlife 
in the hands of the communities who live, and thus pay the price for living, in 
proximity to the resource. The CAMPFIRE programme is informed by the idea that 
common property regimes, unlike open access,, are a sustainable form of resource 
management. The strength of communal tenure lies in the fact that it defines the 
resource users and specifies the property rights of the legitimate users.
Common property can be regarded as group private property. However, unlike a 
private property regime where rights are held by individuals, in common property 
rights are held by the group. A property right is a claim to a benefit stream (from a 
resource) while excluding others (outsiders) from realizing this benefit. The 
outsiders have an enforceable duty to respect the rights of the right holder's 
access to the benefits of the property.3 The property right holders in this case are 
a group who have a corporate claim to the benefit, or income stream, from a 
resource. The same group excludes outsiders from using the resource held under 
this regime. In common property we deal with social relations between groups who 
are the owners of a resource, and groups or individuals excluded from the 
resource.
This is a discussion of membership regarding wildlife as a resource held under a 
common property regime in the CAMPFIRE districts of Guruve, Binga, Tsholotsho 
and Bulilimamangwe in Zimbabwe.
Group Size and Membership
Group size is an important variable in the management of common property 
resources.Jn a common property regime, group size is specified.4 In effective 
common property regimes the size of the group is small, the users reasonably 
homogeneous in important characteristics and residing in close proximity to the 
resource.5 As Murphree points out -
3 D.W. Bromley, The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy,' in: 
Environmental and Resource Economics. 2, 1-17 (page 2), 1992.
4 D.W. Bromley and M.M. Cernea, The Management of Common Property Natural 
Resources. Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. (Washington: The World Bank, 
1989). Discussion Paper # 57 (page 6).
5 ibid (page 24)
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. .large scale structures tend to be ineffective, increasing the potential for 
inefficiency, corruption and the evasion of responsibility. . . .  a communal 
resource management regime is enhanced if  it is small enough (in 
membership size) for all members to be in occasional face to face contact, 
enforce conformity to rules through peer pressure and has long standing 
collective identity. A‘
The determination of who is a member becomes important in deciding the group 
size.
A Methodological Note
The data for this study comes from fieldwork which was conducted in four 
districts - Guruve, Binga, Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe - where members of the 
research team have a long history of research work. Unlike other research studies 
within the Centre of Applied Social Sciences, which have often involved a sole 
researcher holding interviews with the iocal leadership as well as government 
resource managers (some of which are very useful), this project involved three 
research fellows working as a team on the same problem. The advantage of this 
team method was that local people, as well as resource managers at district level, 
were at once exposed to the management experiences of other districts 
represented by research fellows. A particular research feffow would often shed 
some light on how her or his district had dealt with a similar problem which our 
interviewees were experiencing and looking for a solution to. There was also 
another advantage. As a team, we helped each other to state and often 
reformulate questions which we asked respondents. The result was that 
appropriate questions were asked. We are, therefore, more certain of the validity of 
our data - a situation which would be different had we followed the 'traditional' 
method indicated earlier on. Team work proved useful not only to the research but 
also to the people on whom the research was being done.
6 M.W. Murphree, Communities as Institutions for Resource Management. (University 
of Zimbabwe: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1991). CASS Occasional Paper..Series - 
NRM ; (reprinted 1992), page 7.
See also J.H. Peterson. A_ProtoCainpfiro Initiative in Mahenye Ward, Chipinoe District: 
Development of a wildlife utilisation prograinme in response to community needs. 
(University of Zimbabwe: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1991). CASS Occasional 
Paper Series - NRM ; 3/92, page 39.
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1. Membership Issues in Kanyurira/Masoka
Kanyurira ward lies in Guruve district, Mashonaland West provinctj. vThe area is 
often referred to as Masoka, a name derived from..the royal spirit of the area. At 
present the ward has 169 households, more than double the number reported by 
Cutshall (1989)7 from his 1988 survey at the early stages of CAMPFIRE. This 
growth can be attributed to the arrival of close to 45 VaDoma households, 
immigrants from Masvingo province and natural increase of the local population.
A ward is made up of six (sometimes seven) videos with an average of 100 
households each. Kanyurira ward is uniciue in that it is made up of three videos 
with an average of 56 households each. The ward has an area of four hundred 
square kilometres with settlement taking up only four percent of this area. The 
rest of the area is used as a wildlife reserve. Due* to the presence of tsetse flies, 
the ward does not have any cattle. A few households have managed to rear goats 
only.
In 1989 Kanyurira ward developed a land use* plan whereby the 16 square 
kilometres of settlement was fenced With a solar powered fence donated by the 
World Wide Fund For Nature Multispecies project to keep wildlife away from 
damaging people's crops and endangering their lives too. The rest of the area was 
left unfenced for wildlife. At present the ward is generating a substantial amount 
of income from wildlife safari hunting.
Membership in CAMPFIRE
The definition of membership in Masoka is continuously changing. At the surface, 
the general agreement within the community is that everyone who was in the 
village when the programme started is considered a CAMPFIRE member, a nhengo. 
With the realisation that some local people who had long left the area were coming 
back and claiming natural resource management benefits, e.g. household cash 
dividends without the intention to settle in the area, the community decided to set 
up some conditions for membership. These conditions may also have been partly a 
result of the influence of implementing agencies raising the problems the 
community could experience by letting too many immigrants settle in their area as 
a result of «'rn influx of immigrants coming to settle in the valley.
Immigrants are divided into two major categories. Tin.* first are those coming from 
within the Valley. The Vadoma are an example of this. Tin; second group is made
'  C.R. Cutsluill. "Masoka Kanyurira Ward: A Sorio Economic Baseline Survey of 
Community Households:" (Harare: Centre of Applied Social Sciences (CASS), University 
of Zimbabwe, 1939).
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up of those ctpming from other districts in the country and from neighbouring 
countries. Immigrants from other districts must stay in Masoka for five years 
before they can be accorded -full-membership in CAMPFIRE. During this probation 
period they should be seen participating in CAMPFIRE related activities such as 
attending village meetings, despite not being allowed to make any contributions to 
the discussions. This attendance of village meetings is seen as a reflection of their 
interest in conservation issues in the area and an initiation into natural resource 
management.
Along with the above, the immigrant is supposed to change his/her national 
registration identity card so that one has the Guruve district code. The immigrants 
are also expected to follow the set conservation bye-laws. Failure to follow the 
set rules may result in either expulsion from the village or extension of one's 
probation period. After one has satisfied these requirements, one can then be 
accorded CAMPFIRE membership status which would enable him/her to realise 
"full" benefits from the programme. At the time of this study, none of the 
immigrants had fulfilled the five year probation period requirement but reported 
having attended village meetings.
Membership rules have also been set for-other local residents who did not acquire 
membership status at the start of the programme.' The majority of .these are young 
men who are starting their families. They have to be married for a full year before 
they can be granted full membership status. There seems to be some confusion 
though on the exact period of probation, as some respondents Said the probation 
was two years, rattier than one as pointed out by most of the respondents.
CAMPFIRE members-have to follow the set conservation bye-laws. Failure to 
abide with these bye-laws results in sanctions, which generally involve doing some 
work on CAMPFIRE related projects, or the case being sent to the district level, 
depending on the nature of the case. If one fails to do the work, their membership 
is suspended for a year.
While decisions regarding CAMPFIRE related activities are generally made at village 
meetings, the wildlife committee takes a leading role. Traditional leadership also 
has a significant role to play. These are mainly the chief and the spirit medium 
who are consulted on most of the issues.
CAMPFIRE Costs
While CAMPFIRE appears to be doing well in Masoka, there are some costs that 
people still experience from wildlife;. Both CAMPFIRE members and non-members 
experience similar costs from wildlife. Although the village lias, a game fence, the 
community still experiences problems with crop destruction by smaller animals like 
wild pigs, baboons and monkeys that cannot be kept away by the fence. The
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fence also has some management costs, for example repairs and clearing along the 
fence line.
About 90 percent of the households have some alluvial fields along the Angwa 
river which are located outside the fence. These are often destroyed by bigger 
game like elephant and buffalo. For these fields, people have to invest a lot of 
time into guarding their crops. Despite the risk of losing crops to wildlife, people 
have maintained these alluvial fields because they have some advantage of 
moisture retention over the upland fields. Even non-members have fields along the 
Angwa river, which means they also experience the crop destruction problems. 
There is no direct compensation given for crop loss to both CAMPFIRE members 
and non-members.
CAMPFIRE Benefits
The Masoka community is realizing a lot of benefits from CAMPFIRE through 
projects funded by CAMPFIRE from revenues generated from the programme.
These projects consist of the school, a tractor and the clinic, an electric game 
fence, meat and household cash dividends. These benefits are realized differently 
by those people regarded as CAMPFIRE members and non-members.
Electric game fence
Both members and non-members realise similar benefits from the electric 
game fence in the form of crop protection and safety from wildlife injuries. 
The fence also provides employment opportunities to everyone in the ward. 
Payment is equal for everyone working on the fence.
Employment opportunities
Besides fence employment, the resident safari operator also employs local 
people regardless of their membership status in CAMPFIRE. Local people are 
employed as game trackers, skinners, cooks and guides. Some people have 
also been employed as game guards at the local level and are paid from 
CAMPFIRE revenues. Other employment opportunities come from village 
projects that are funded by CAMPFIRE, for example, molding bricks and 
fetching water for building operations at the school or clinic. Anyone willing 
can be employed on these projects regardless of their CAMPFIRE 
membership status.
Household cash dividends
Distribution of household cash dividends appears to be a very sensitive issue 
in Masoka. Cash dividends are given to household heads who are defined as
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CAMPFIRE members. The amount that each household gets is determined 
at an Annual General Ward Village Budget Meeting. Climatic conditions, for 
example drought, have tended to affect the amount each household 
receives. However, household cash dividends have been increasing since 
1992, when each household received $200. In 1993 households received 
$400 each, and in 1994 dividends had increased to $1 000 per household.
Food distribution
Meat from safari operations is distributed equally to all the ward members 
regardless of their CAMPFIRE membership status. In times of drought, (for 
instance in January 1995) the village may decide to buy some food/maize 
using CAMPFIRE generated funds. This food is distributed to everyone in 
the village but non-CAMPFIRE members have to exchange this for labour. It 
is considered inhuman not to give other people food particularly during a 
time of need.
CAMPFIRE funded village projects
The major CAMPFIRE funded projects in Masoka at the time of this study 
were the school, the tractor and the clinic which is under construction. 
Regarding the school, children of both members and non-members can utilize 
the school facilities although non-members have to pay a certain fee. Like 
household cash dividends, payment of school fees has been a controversial 
issue, with non-members beginning to protest against payment. Members 
do not pay this fee as they are said to be covered by wildlife revenues. The 
village also invested CAMPFIRE revenues in a tractor and a trailer. Everyone 
has access to the tractor for both cultivation and transportation purposes.
For cultivation a higher fee is charged to non-members. However, for 
transportation everyone pays an equal amount. In times of illness, an 
individual is transported for free regardless of their membership status.
2. Membership Issues in Binga
Background
Kabuba Ward is found in Binga, a semi-arid district that lies in the Zambezi valley. 
The ward is made up of a collection of loose villages, each headed by a village 
head who reports directly to the chief. There is also an elected Councillor who 
represents the villages at the District Council, which is the local authority for the 
area.
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The 1992 census put the ward's population at 3772. Of late there has been an 
influx of the Ndebele and Shona 'immigrants' from the neighboring districts of 
Lupane Nkayi and Gokwe.
The ward hosts CAMPFIRE and, for this reason, has set aside some areas 
earmarked for safari hunting. The ward has elephants, most of which spill over 
from the nearby Chizarira National Park.
The Costs Involved in CAMPFIRE
The costs from wildlife are as follows. Wildlife, particularly elephants, roam about 
the villages destroying farmers crops. Sometimes they destroy huts and granaries 
as they search for food. Occasionally, people are also injured as they try to 
safeguard their property from wildlife damage. There are reports that people have 
been killed by elephants as they tried to safeguard they property. Lions and hyena 
also kill farmers' livestock. Finally people are scared of walking at night, and some 
are forced to put off their errands or tasks when darkness falls. These are costs 
which are associated with living next door to wildlife.
These costs are distributed in the following manner. Those who live at the 
periphery of the villages are the first to suffer damage. Villages in the interior suffer 
less, as those at the front bear the brunt of crop damage. Since most of the people 
who live in the periphery of the villages are immigrants, damage is more 
concentrated on them than the Tonga people. Immigrants' activities and 
movements are limited by wildlife. Their agriculture suffers heavily from wildlife 
damage.
In the ward there is no clear policy on compensation for crop damage. Although 
there are cases where people were compensated for the destruction of their crops, 
the majority of victims have not been compensated at all. The argument put 
forward by the wildlife management committee, and supported by the local 
authority, is that compensation will reduce the amount of money that would 
otherwise be available for social services.
Membership and Benefits
The range of benefits are as follows. There is money that comes from safari 
hunting and tourism. Sometimes there is meat which comes from the culled 
animals or those animals shot for giving problems to the local people. In addition 
there is also the benefit whjjph comes in the form of protection from wildlife. 
Normally the Safari hunter'vfbo buys hunting concessions in the ward is obliged to 
protect the villagers from Wildlife. There are also people who are employed 
through CAMPFIRE funds to drive away marauding elephants. Finally, there is the 
land and other forest products.
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The Tonga people say that the benefits are limited to than alone. The Council too 
say that benefits are limited to the Tonga people, ie. those born in Binga. But this 
is contradicted by reality. Any person, whether an outsider or not, is entitled to 
land which can be acquired through laid out procedures. Similarly/all people who 
< are members of the village in the sense of being the subjects of the Sabhuku are 
entitled to forestry products. The rule is this: once a person gets permission to 
settle in the area he is entitled to land and forest products. Similarly, all people are 
entitled to benefit from wildlife revenue and meat.- In one village, outsiders were 
offered dividends but refused to accept them on the grounds that they were too 
little. Each person was'supposed to get $11.00. In alLthe villages of the ward, 
meat from marauding elephants is shared among the people and the exact amount 
which each person gets depends on their strength and fitness to outdo others in 
cutting portions, not on ethnic identity. Also, in all areas both outsiders and 
legitimate members use facilities such as schools and clinics built from CAMPFIRE 
revenue. Immigrants are not barred from attending schools built using money from 
CAMPFIRE. More telling is that both outsiders and people born in the ward are 
heavily subsidized by CAMPFIRE. The ward buys mealie-mealie using CAMPFIRE 
funds and then sells it below poice to all villagers.
Decision Making in CAMPFIRE
In theory immigrants are not entitled to leadership positions in CAMPFIRE. In fact, 
it is stated regularly by Tonga people supported by Council, that the outsiders 
cannot be elected to leadership positions in other development institutions too, not 
just CAMPFIRE. Thus all the committee members from the village to the Ward who 
are involved in the administration of CAMPFIRE from the village to the ward level 
are supposed to be Tonga people. In practice, both Tonga people and non-Tonga 
people are eligible to leadership position in CAMPFIRE institutions. There is no 
committee which does not have outsiders in its composition.
In addition, immigrants attend CAMPFIRE annual general meetings where they 
actively suggest the direction the programme should take. Finally, immigrants are 
members in farmer associations. Such associations are influential in structuring the 
direction CAMPFIRE takes. Thus it was the farmers association in the ward, in 
conjunction with other associations in the districts, which pushed for intensive 
problem animal control strategies in the district.
In conclusion, communal resources in Kabuba seem to be open to all people in the 
village regardless of their origins. Membership of the village gives one access to 
the resources in the area. Membership itself is open to any person who promises to 
abide and respect the rules of the land.
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3. Membership Issues in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho Districts
Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotshtrare'.'adjacent to one another and at one time ran a 
joint safari operation. The CAMPFIRE project in both districts revolves around 
wildlife hunting, especially the elephant. In terms of resource endowment 
Tsholotsho has more elephants than Bulilimamangwe.
Who is a Member?
In discussing membership issues Bulilimamangwe^and Tsholotsho can be grouped 
together. In both districts, there are some wards which are in the CAMPFIRE 
programme and some which are not.
Tsholotsho has eight out of 20 wards in the CAMPFIRE programme. In this, district 
there are three wards which have a common boundary with the wildlife area or'the 
Hwange National Park. These wards are included in the CAMPFIRE programme. 
There are four other wards which have been included in the programme which do 
not share a boundary with the wildlife area but suffer from wildlife crop damage, 
mainly from the elephant.
Bulilimamangwe has seven out of 24 wards in the-CAMPFIRE programme. These 
seven wards were selected on the basis of their claims or^the wildlife area for 
grazing purposes. Some of the distant wards use the area for grazing in dry years 
and do not use the area during the good years. However, these wards have made a 
historical claim to the area although they have least contact with wildlife. There is 
an awareness among the project planners that there is a difference amongst the 
wards within the same district regarding interaction with wildlife. The selection of 
these wards wais done by the Rural District Council with the assistance of a ~ 
N.G.O., Zimbabwe Trust.
In both Districts each household which resides in the CAMPFIRE wards is regarded 
as a member of the resource owning unit. There is no difference in status among 
households regarding the position of the household vis-a-vis the wildlife area. 
However, settlement patterns show a higher concentration of homes away from 
the wildlife area in both districts.
During the interviews respondents were asked if they were willing to accept 
immigrants. Officials', like councillors from the wards, felt that if there was space 
in the area an immigrant could come provided she or he had formalised the move 
with the relevant authorities. The usual procedures are informing the traditional 
leadership, the councillors and getting a permit to reside from the Rural District 
Council. Some of the local respondents expressed the desire to keep the land free 
of immigrants so that their children could get some land for agriculture and
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settlements in the future. In no case did the respondents indicate that more 
immigrants were a threat to the wildlife resource and habitat.
Ward One in Tsholotsho shares a boundary with a wildlife area. The wildlife area 
has several species, some of which stray from the Hwange National Park. 
Settlement in this area is not as dense as in other interior wards. The councillor for 
the ward was asked whether he would like more people to come and reside in his 
ward. In reply he said, 'We are in the bush at our place, we need more people in 
our area to keep the wild animals at a distance.' This ward receives the second 
highest amount of cash revenues from wildlife safari hunting. This is because of its 
high wildlife population and suitable habitat. However, the councillor felt that the 
wildlife was a menace which could be reduced by increasing human population and 
density in the word.
Government provision of services in the area is also considered when people regard 
the issue of immigrants, ie. group size. The water and sanitation requirements are 
such that there is a minimum number of households required before services like 
boreholes are provided by the government.-Therefore, larger numbers of people are 
regarded os a strategy to attract services into the area. Politically, constituencies 
are also being determined in terms of human population. These are issues which 
communities and their leaders also consider when they take in immigrants.
Community and Costs
The communities in the two districts are aware of the costs they suffer as a result 
of wildlife. There is a greater awareness of costs than benefits from wildlife within 
the communities.-This was succinctly put by the councillor for Ward Two of 
Tsholotsho when he said that 'the communities do not care about the money, they 
are worried about problem animal control. ' The major issue is that of problem 
animal controi which most feel is not adequately addressed.
Wildlife, especially the elephant, invade fields eating up most of the crops. This 
affects those people who are nearest to the wildlife area much more than those 
who are further away, The costs are, therefore, unevenly distributed within the 
CAMPFIRE wards. However, the communities do not view the problem of costs as 
being solved by monetary benefits from wildlife - but rather by effective problem 
animal control.
Community and Benefits
Benefits from tfie CAMPFIRE programme in the two districts come in various 
forms. These ore money for households and projects, and meat from wildlife 
hunting and problem animal control.
TO
Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe'differ in the process of benefit distribution. 
Tsholotsho has taker) steps to deliver the highest proportion of benefits to the 
wards which have the highest number of animals and, therefore, the habitat for 
wildlife. The vyard in which the hunt takes place is regarded as the producer of the 
animal. The producing ward gets 50 percent of the revenues from that particular 
animal. However, wildlife is a fugitive resource which affects even those wards 
where hunts may not take place. As a result, 50 percent of the revenue from safari 
operations is also shared equally among the remaining CAMPFIRE wards. The 
wards closest to the wildlife area are satisfied with this arrangement because they 
are able to get:the greater share of the revenues. Those wards which are in the 
interior where hoots do not take place are demanding that this condition should be 
changed and all wards should get equal shares of wildlife revenues. The 'frontline' 
wards have argued that this should net be the case until a proposed electric fence 
is erected. This is an acknowledgement that the elephant is the source of the 
money and the electric fence will keep these animals away from their fields in the 
future.
Within the wards the revenues are shared equally among the villages making up 
the ward. It is up to the villages to decide how the money is used in the ward. In 
terms of benefit distribution, there is an indication that all members of the ward 
should benefit. There is no effort to exclude other villages or households from 
benefiting from wildlife revenues. Household dividends depend on the number of 
people who claim a share of the money. In other words, the size of the population 
determines the amount of money each household receives. There has not been an 
effort to reduce or keep to a minimum the number of households which receive 
benefits from wildlife funds.
Bulilimamangwe has one wildlife area where hunting takes place. This is the area 
which is also used for seasonal grazing. Benefits from wildlife hunting are shared 
equally among the wards. The wards then share the revenues equally among 
villages. The money in Bulilimamagwe has been used for development projects in 
most cases. During the interviews we pointed out to the local government officials 
that not all the wards paid the same price for wildlife damage and livestock 
predation. Jn reply, it was pointed out that it is difficult to exclude some of the 
wards because they were included in the setting up of the project. Some of the 
councillors put a lot of effort into yetting the people to agree to the project. These 
councillors would not agree to be excluded at this stage of the project;
Makhulela ward in Bulilimamangwe shares a boundary with the wildlife area. The 
households in one of the villages, Sihoho, suffer a lot of crop damage from wildlife. 
However, they did not feel that they were entitled to a greater share of the wildlife 
revenues. Their wish was that problem animal control should be. intensified so that 
they can get enough food for their families. One woman felt that it was not proper 
for her village, although they were in the frontline, to receive all the revenues from
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wildlife; while others, even though they did not suffer crop damage, did not receive 
any revenues.
The idea of embarking on community projects is regarded as a form of community 
development. The projects are said to be good because they benefit the whole 
community. The feeling is that of inclusion rather than exclusion, where all people 
should receive the benefits.
Ward Seven in Tsholotsho also receives the greatest share of the financial benefits 
from wildlife. The ward councillor argues that the ward suffers the highest cost in 
terms of wildlife crop damage and livestock predation. Income from wildlife safari 
hunting has been used to build a community hall, and a grocery store in a central 
village. This hall and store are for the benefit of the whole community. Some 
money has been used to buy maize for resale to the whole community at no profit. 
Those from nearby Ward Eight can also purchase the grain although they are not 
members of that ward. The wildlife committee has given money to schools in the 
ward for development and some for parents' day celebrations. Some of the schools 
have pupils from other wards. Even immigrants from other districts enjoy the 
benefits from CAMPFIRE'S wildlife utilisation.
Meat as benefit
Meat was not regarded as an important issue in both districts. Some 
expressed the feeling that they were not used to eating elephant meat 
anyway. In Tsholotsho those who live closest to where a hunt has taken 
place are the ones who receive the meat. The wildlife chairman in Ward 
Three said that there were plans to dry the meat and sell it to earn more 
revenue.8 In Bulilimamangwe, distance was cited as the problem which 
keeps the majority of people from receiving meat. This does not seem to 
raise any negative feelings among the people.
Members and the Decision Making Process
In this study we were interested in studying the extent to which the community, 
as the legitimate owner of a resource, is involved in the decision making process. 
This is important to show the extent to which members of a resource owning 
group organise themselves in the management of a resource.
Both Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe districts have wildlife committees at districts 
ward and village level. Important decisions regarding wildlife revenues and projects
8 See also Peterson, 1991 (page 14).
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are discussed at ward level in a general meeting. The general meeting is for the 
whole ward and each member can participate in the debates.
The inter-ward committee at district level is composed of ward councillors and 
wildlife committee representatives from each ward wildlife committee. The inter- 
Ward committee is responsible for selection of tenders for hunting, reporting to 
council on how they have been using the revenues allocated to their ward, and 
submitting proposals for projects in their wards.
The ward committee is responsible for keeping the finances allocated to the ward 
from wildlife revenues. In the case of Ward Three of Tsholotsho, a planning 
committee which is not the wildlife committee has been set up to vet and prioritise 
the projects which must be undertaken in the ward.
Quota Setting
Quota setting is an involved process which requires a knowledge of the number of 
animals in the area. This is further complicated by the fact that some of the 
wildlife, especially elephants, move from the National Park into the communal area 
in search of browse. Final determination of the quota is done by the Department of 
National Parks and Wild Life Management. In this exercise there is little or no 
participation by the local community. The major constraint is the lack of adequate 
information and techniques.
Conclusions
Common property theorists do not just characterize commons. They say that small 
populations are important to resource use. Communal property systems which are 
successful are those which limit resource use to a clearly defined group. 
Conversely, communities which are successful actively exclude outsiders from 
having access to these resources.
It appears from our data that some communities actively involved in common 
property systems do not share this idea. They do not believe that they should have 
sole claims to natural resources. Thus, in Bulilimamangwe, local villagers pointed 
out that grazing was open to other people even those from afar. In Tsholotsho 
villagers saw nothing wrong in allowing children from non-producing areas to enjoy 
the benefits from CAMPFIRE. In Binga outsiders were allowed, just like anybody 
else, to buy subsidized maize meal bought using CAMPFIRE money. Finally, in 
Masoka outsiders were allowed to use CAMPFIRE facilities, though at a nominal 
price.
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Tho case studies general ly suggest that., provided needy people f rom other areas 
fo l low local cus toms and procedures regarding set t lement  as well  as regarding 
resource usage, t f iey can become part of the com m on  property system.
It is not clear as to w h y  the pract ice of inclusion is prevalent. Our speculat ion is 
that  local people regard natural resources as something to be shared w i th  those in 
need. We also speculate that local people a l low  outsiders to benefi t  f rom wi ld l i fe 
as a return for other non-wi ld l i fe related benef i ts wh ich  they receive f rom such 
outsiders.  These, however ,  are speculat ions wh ich  need further research.
This general pract ice of inclusion poses a di lemma for CAMPFIRE. Benef i ts become 
Too st retched,  to the extent  that  their value cannot  act as an incent ive for  wi ld l i fe 
conservat ion.  W i th  changes in demography,  norms and values in general,  and 
those govern ing natural  resource conservat ion  in part icular,  become heterogenous. 
They general ly become di f f icul t  to enforce. A l though  this is not yet  the s i tuat ion in 
the areas that we  studied, there is no doubt  that over the years these dynamics  
and processes wi l l  increasingly become signi f icant.  Those work ing  in CAMPFIRE 
must,  then, strive to conv ince the communit ies  that  their inclusive pract ices 
ul t imately negate the programme.
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